[sword-devel] Engine personal cipher support / Nestle - Aland 28th ed. German Bible Society
Michael H
cmahte at gmail.com
Wed Oct 30 17:24:58 MST 2019
If/when this is available, please post on the Crosswire facebook page. :-)
I will promote it.
On Wed, Oct 30, 2019 at 6:31 PM Troy A. Griffitts <scribe at crosswire.org>
wrote:
> Hi Jaak,
>
> Thank you for pointing out one problematic input condition which passes
> the validation checks already in the code.
>
> Your statement that there is no validation on input is incorrect. There
> is validation on input. You found one case which passed those
> validation checks. An additional check has been added to handle your
> case of passing an empty personalization prefix to the depersonalization
> mechanism.
>
> We appreciate your reporting of this unvalidated scenario. If you find
> additional strings which cause issues, please continue to provide feedback.
>
> Regarding the publisher's reason for requesting personalized unlock
> codes, in their mind, a user is less likely to share their unlock code
> if it is, e.g.,
>
> RISTIOJAJA2019-wEt-lum-UIw-GlQN
>
> They know it does not provide any additional software protection.
>
> I agree with their reasoning that it is a disincentive to share one's
> unlock key if the origin of that shared key can be traced back to a user.
>
> Hope this makes sense,
>
> Troy
>
>
> On 10/30/19 3:30 PM, Jaak Ristioja wrote:
> > Hello!
> >
> > On 29.10.19 23:42, Troy A. Griffitts wrote:
> >> #1 was included as an update to our engine with this commit:
> >>
> >> commit f4ac4caeacd762c90c2b2cef5755bf745e3a6d58
> >> Author: scribe <scribe at bcd7d363-81e1-0310-97ec-a550e20fc99c>
> >> Date: Sat Dec 29 21:23:25 2018 +0000
> >>
> >> Added personalization mechanism for cipher keys
> >> git-svn-id: https://crosswire.org/svn/sword/trunk@3614
> >> bcd7d363-81e1-0310-97ec-a550e20fc99c
> >
> > As the maintainer of Sword++, I regularly merge in changes from Sword.
> > When this commit was made in 2018, I did not figure out why exactly it
> > was needed. Because the code also seemed suspicious, I decided not to
> > merge this commit into the Sword++ codebase at that point. Haven now
> > given it some additional thought, I'm even more sceptical.
> >
> > The current implementation does not seem to provide any additional
> > security benefits. It could actually make things worse by providing a
> > false sense of security. Could you please explain why exactly the
> > "personal keys" logic is needed in the first place? What do the
> > stakeholders believe to gain?
> >
> > On a more technical side, the function seems to make certain
> > undocumented presumptions about the input string. The function does
> > not validate its inputs and crashes in simple cases like in the
> > following:
> >
> > SWBuf test("-asdf");
> > SWCipher::personalize(test, false); // SIGFPE !?
> >
> > Since it is not acceptable for frontends to crash on invalid user
> > input, they would need to validate the input before passing it to this
> > function. How should they do that? What is the format for the input
> > string? Would it be possible document these requirements in the inline
> > code documentation for SWCipher::personalize() please?
> >
> >
> > Best regards,
> > J
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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